Jottings from the Granite Studio

A Qing historian reads the newspaper…

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Those who don’t learn from history, blah, blah, blah

October 6th, 2006 · 7 Comments

The Chinese are rightly proud of their long history, and being a ‘history buff’ in China is still a quasi-prestigious hobby. In the US, on the other hand, history buffs are usually mocked openly until it comes time to pick teams for Trivia Night at the local pub. But such is. Despite their professed love of their own history, do the Chinese actually learn anything while reading the great chronicles of the past? Consider the Chinese strategy of 以夷制夷 (yi yi zhi yi or “use barbarians against barbarians”/”play foreign powers off of each other.”)


The Song dynasty managed to reunify most of the eastern provinces of the old Tang empire by about 960 AD but they never quite got around to dislodging a parcel of stubborn kingdoms on the northern and western flanks of the empire. These included the Tanguts (or Xixia) and especially the Khitans in the Northeast who had the audacity to declare a rival dynasty, the Liao and demand that the Song emperors pay tribute to them.

Beginning in the early 12th century, a new power emerged to the north of Khitans: the Jurchens. The Song could see that the Jurchens, unified under their first great chief, Wanyan Aguda, were a force to be reckoned with and moreover, were spoiling for a fight to claim the Liao territories. The Song opportunistically got into bed with the Jurchen, who then blew through the Khitans (barely pausing for a stick of chuan’r) as they helped themselves to all of northern China down to the Wei River. The Song court, after losing an emperor, an army, and most of their officials, ignobly fled south finally setting up shop in Hangzhou.

Flash forward about 100 years. A new, new power has emerged on the Central Asian steppe: a chieftain (Temüjin a.k.a. Chinggis Khan) has risen to more or less unite the Mongol clans (who usually hated each other) and whip them into one of the fiercest armies the world had seen up to that point: an unpredictable bloodthirsty army hungry for conquest…or, as the Song saw it, the perfect ally. The Song encouraged the Mongols to attack the Jurchens (who had founded their own dynasty, the Jin, in the meantime) and before they could say “Do you think maybe we should build a big wall?” the Jin had fallen and the Mongols were knocking on the door of the Song palace. To the Song Empire’s credit, they held out against the Mongols longer than most people. It took about 50 years and the almost complete annihilation of every living being in Sichuan but the Song defenses finally crumbled.

Let’s jump ahead a few more years to 1644. In the final years of the Ming Dynasty, the empire was in chaos. Gross mismanagement in the capital, poor morale among the army, and corruption among local officials had weakened the dynasty to the point of open rebellion. Two giant bandit armies, one lead by a man named Li Zicheng, rampaged across western and central China. Li finally stormed the capital at Beijing in 1644. The last Ming emperor rang the bell to summon his officials for advice, when none came (they were getting the hell outta Dodge), he slipped out the back of the Forbidden City, climbed a short way up a hill in what is today Jingshan Park and hung himself from a tree.

The last line of defense was a general named Wu Sangui who was stationed east of Beijing at a place called Shanhaiguan, where the Great Wall meets the sea. (After they kicked out the Mongols in 1368, the Ming finally got around to finishing that really big wall.) Wu’s job was to hold the pass because on the opposite side of the wall waited yet another force from the Northeast, the Manchus: united decades earlier by Nurhaci but by that time “ruled” by a child emperor and de facto controlled by the boy’s uncle, Dorgon.

(I will now use Ken Burns-speak, where all history, especially battles, are told in the present tense. Feel free to put on some nostalgic and quaint acoustic music in the background as you read the next passage.)

Wu faces a dilemma: march on Beijing and save the capital or hold the pass. Hearing that the armies of Li had begun marching east, Wu makes the fateful mistake of using the barbarians to control the bandits. Dorgon can hardly believe his ears and agrees to assist Wu in this ‘peacekeeping mission.’ The Manchus sweep through the pass, rout Li Zicheng, pacify the capital, restore law and order and then proceed to march south. They wouldn’t leave until nearly three centuries later.

(End Ken Burns production)

All of this occurred to me this week as I watch China in its appointed role as “mediator” between the United States, Japan, and North Korea. I wonder: If the Chinese remember just how many times this strategy has come back to bite them on the 屁股, will Beijing proceed differently?
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Pictures:
Top left, map of Song empire showing divisions
Middle right, painting of a Mongol archer
Bottom right, photograph of Great Wall at Simatai, Summer 2002

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Tags: Chinese History

7 responses so far ↓

  • 1 wu ming // Oct 7, 2006 at 3:23 pm

    nah, they’ve got a much better position vis a vis the other negotiating parties this time than in those other historical analogies. the song and ming were operating from a desperate position of weakness, against foes with a decided military edge, and whom the chinese had poor intelligence on or even familiarity with.

    by contrast, the chinese today have both military deterrance and - more importantly - diplomatic indispensability. every party in this needless diplomatic runaround* depends on chinese support to make things work.

    *had john bolton not intentionally derailed the growing rapproachement between the two koreas back in 2001, we likely wouldn’t even be having this discussion.

  • 2 花崗齋之愚公 // Oct 8, 2006 at 7:33 pm

    S,
    I thought I might get you to take the

    bait on this post…obviously in matters Song, I should defer to you. We could possibly debate whether or not China’s military edge vis-a-vis the United States is decided or not, but overall I agree with your basic premise that China operates from a different position today than it did in either the Song or Ming.

  • 3 wu ming // Oct 8, 2006 at 11:58 pm

    i figured as much. ;-)

    well, north korea’s got the bomb. 100 bucks says americans get more panicky than the south koreans, who are actually in the crosshairs (well, them and japan. abe’s gonna have a field day with this one).

  • 4 ChinaLawBlog // Oct 9, 2006 at 8:10 am

    I would love to see you update this post in light of recent events.

  • 5 花崗齋之愚公 // Oct 9, 2006 at 8:53 am

    @CLB and Sean,

    Thanks for the tips, I woke up this morning to the news. Bad times.

  • 6 The Humanaught // Oct 13, 2006 at 8:25 am

    @J: Question.. and though it doesn’t ‘flow’ with the line here in the comments - What was the relationship between the Jurchens and the Koreans. Are there bloodlines there?

    I know the Jurchens/Jin were basically the predecessors to the Manchus, and I’m just curious what kind of ties they had. Any idea?

  • 7 花崗齋之愚公 // Oct 13, 2006 at 3:39 pm

    @ Ryan,

    It’s a tough question because terms like “Jurchen” and “Manchu” refer to groups or polities as much as they do specific ethnicities. As for who is and who is not Korean, I’ll refer you to the three posts below on the ongoing debate between PRC and Korean scholars over the “Chinese-ness” of ancient “Korean” kingdoms.

    Korea-China History Row, Part 1

    Korea-China History Row, Part 2

    Korea-China History Row, Part 3

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