Interesting take by Jim Yardley in today’s NYT on the recent corruption purges and crackdowns in the PRC. Yardley argues that the endemic nature of corruption in China makes fighting corrupt practices difficult–if not impossible–without serious structural reforms.
In an economic boom gilded with excess and profiteering, official corruption is so widespread, and increasingly so brazen, that it is almost taken for granted. The latest World Bank governance survey found that China had seriously backslid in the category of “containing corruption” when much of the rest of the world, if not improving, was basically unchanged on the issue.
President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao have warned that corruption threatens the credibility and legitimacy of Communist Party rule and have vowed to stamp it out. But many experts say that truly stamping out corruption would involve the type of broad political reform and a full embrace of the rule of law that the party has long resisted. The current corruption sweep authorized by Mr. Hu in Shanghai and other cities is widely viewed as more of a purge of allies linked to his predecessor, President Jiang Zemin, than an unfettered crackdown.
“The problem with China today is that if you want to pursue corruption, so many people are tainted,” said Minxin Pei, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. As a result, Mr. Pei noted, Mr. Hu could never investigate corruption solely on its merits because it would topple so many of his own political allies.
The government during the late 19th century also faced serious problems of widespread corruption and cronyism between official and commercial interests. The response? Repeated calls for officials to more rigorously follow the mandates of Confucian virtue in upholding their offices. For you see, to blame the imperial system for the problems of the late Qing would have dangerously undermined the legitimacy of the Manchu rulers. When the Qing court finally did give in (following the Boxer debacle in 1900), the Qing “New Policies” created unprecedented political and institutional bodies, such as provincial assemblies and the New Army divisions, that then played key roles in sweeping the Qing from power in 1911. The CCP are not stupid. They know that the kinds of reforms necessary to create a culture of law and accountability would inevitably weaken the party’s grip on power. The question is: Are China’s problems so serious as to force the CCP’s hand in the near future or can the party continue with the current strategies of exhortations, purges, and institutional tinkering?
———————————————
For more on these issues see:
Confucianism and a Harmonious Society
Wang Hui and China’s New New Left
The problems are so serious that there needs to be systemic change to get rid of them. But, the Party is much more concerned about maintaining its power than in getting rid of corruption, so it will remain until such time as it clearly threatens the Party.
I couldn’t agree more. I think that the CCP might be caught in a trap here not unlike that which befell the Qing. The act of adaptation is often a violent and turbulent process (as the Qing soon learned). I think the CCP is will in the future face a similar lesson.
It keeps bringing me back to the same question, though, which I don’t think anybody has figured out: if it forces the CCP’s hand in the near future, what does that mean? What are the consequences? Again, it’s not like there’s any kind of structured order waiting in the wings to replace it, and I think that’s the rock-hard place scenario that Wang Hui and indeed a great deal of ordinary Chinese find themselves in.
the trick is to look beyond the monolithic party and the government to the power networks within both. i would not rule out the center trying to make an alliance with the populace against the local and provincial governments, in a sort of rational maoist strategy.
from the perspective of a central party official who notices the very real problems with, say, corruption or environmental degredation or labor and rural unrest, to throw a few out there, supporting some form of democratization or at least allowing enough space for a civil sphere to pressure intransigent local governments might turn out to be a pretty good deal, if it doesn’t blow the whole thing apart, getting back to J and dave’s point.
this article at grist.com might be overly optimistic, but similar sorts of things have turned up here and there as well. the real question is when these groups come into direct conflict with local officials, who will the central party side with?
Dave,
You nailed it and it’s what makes China’s near future so fascinating to watch. History suggests it’s going to be a bumpy ride and a Soviet-style break-up is one of many, many possibilities. Another is a PLA takeover followed by some kind of rule by a junta. You have to think that’s even a worse fate than CCP rule.
Again, I go back to the Qing. Many foreigners felt that the Qing court was the source of all of China’s problems, both foreign and domestic. There were many foreigners (and not a few Chinese) who wanted the Qing gone so that they could work with a modern, democratically elected, and rational government that would play by the rules.
What did they get?
Yuan Shikai. Followed by 10 years of total anarchy.