Many–if not both–of my readers know that one of my favorite political commentators is the former editor of Freezing Point, Li Datong.
Writing for openDemocracy.net on China’s leadership, Li argues that the status gap between the paramount leader and the rest of the party leadership has narrowed with each successive generation. Most notably, with every passing of the torch the top leader’s ability to choose his own successor has significantly weakend. Mao had to “settle” on Hua Guofeng. After losing Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, Deng was forced to take Jiang Zemin, and because Jiang was such a mess, Deng himself chose Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao.
Now with the 17th party congress upon us, Li argues that Hu is in the same position as his predecessors, but with even less power to designate an heir:
The reason Hu was able to take over from Jiang was the status gap between him and other candidates. However, this gap was not based on authority or political achievements, but merely on ten years more experience of life in the politburo. This is a fairly weak claim to authority, and is not enough to give Hu the power to appoint his own successor.
It is interesting that although he does not have this power, Hu will be looking at the group of potential successors and seeing that none of them is in a stronger position than any of the others. The rising stars touted by the media such as Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang and are starting out on a level playing-field.
What excites Li about this situation is not what happens this October, but what would have to happen at the next meeting:
It is this set of circumstances that will give rise to real change. All Hu can now do is bring a group of potential successors (probably three or four people) into the politburo standing committee and see who can establish the most authority for themselves over the coming five years. Then, before he steps down at the eighteenth party congress in 2012, he must put in place a strict system for choosing between these candidates. This system can only be in the form of an election - there is no other legitimate way of selecting the next leader. This will be the start of the democratisation of the Chinese Communist Party.
The party was founded in 1921, and intra-party democracy could be established by 2012. Ninety years is a long time for this development to emerge, but the rule in Chinese politics has always been the same: the older generation has to disappear before the new generation can truly emerge.
I like Li’s optimism. I hope he’s right. I also see in this situation the possibility for bloody tanistry.
The Kangxi Empe
ror ruled for 61 years (1661-1722), consolidated Manchu control of China proper, brought Taiwan under the control of Beijing for the first time in Chinese history, put down a major rebellion that threatened to split the country north and south, and is generally considered one of the top-five emperors of all time. His biggest failing was that he was never able to decide which of his sons should succeed him. His first choice, Prince Yinreng, turned out to be mentally unstable and soon word filtered back to Kangxi of his heir’s debauchery, cruelty, and arrogance. The story goes that in a hastily called meeting of his sons and high officials, Kangxi tearfully stripped Prince Yinreng of his status as crown prince. So great was the emotional stain of this moment, that Kangxi apparently suffered a mini-stroke as a result. From then on, it was open season as officials formed cliques around the different princes, each vying for power, with predictable results for the efficiency of Qing central administration.
When Kangxi died, all hell broke loose. There is a legend that Kangxi chose his 14th son to be his heir but that his 4th son, Prince Yinzhen, simply erased the “1″ from the written will and so seized power for himself. It kind of helped that Yinzhen was the only brother in Beijing at the time and he was–oh wait for it–in control of the imperial guards in the capital.
However it was done, Yinzhen, now known as the Yongzheng Emperor, took the throne and promptly rounded up the rest of his brothers and had most of them either executed, thrown in prison, or banished. For the rest of his reign, Yongzheng bristled at the persistent whispers of usurpation and fratricide.
As I tell my students every quarter: “If you ever find yourself being named imperial ruler of a
mid-sized to large dynasty, the first thing you need to do is keep an eye on your siblings. It’s what we call the ‘Yongzheng/Michael Corleone rule of succession.’”
Back to the present day, nobody is going to be losing their heads this time around, that era has thankfully passed, and certainly the CCP leadership has shown itself capable of orderly transitions of power. But a situation in which three or four likely candidates have five years to jockey for position ahead of the next party congress is one fraught with possibilities. New cliques and factions will certainly form as officials circle around one of several centers of power. Control over different media outlets and for screen time on CCTV will put pressure on the propaganda bureau to either choose sides or get out of the way. Patronage will be the name of the game. The possibilities for corruption and, at the very least, policy gridlock will be high.
On a more positive note though, even with the tight control over media coverage of intra-party squabbles, it is hard to imagine that this kind of protracted leadership struggle could be kept completely out of the public eye. Such a fracas might even cause people in China to take sides, arguing about the strengths and weaknesses of each potential leader instead of simply complaining about the guy that’s already been foisted on to them. Maybe the people still wouldn’t have a say, but it might be a start. After all, hope–like mildew–springs eternal.
Anyway, another great commentary by Li Datong.
——————-
Photo top right: (l to r Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping
Picture middle left: The Kangxi Emperor, r. 1661-1722
Picture bottom left: Michael and Fredo share a quiet moment in Havana.
Picture bottom right: The Yongzheng Emperor, r. 1723-1735

6 responses so far ↓
1 無名 - wu ming // Oct 7, 2007 at 2:19 am
it’s long past time for a little 亂. democracy is a far safer game for the patricipants than palace coups, anyway.
not that most mainlanders appreciate this, but hopefully the bigshots in the CCP have noticed that after taiwan democractised, not only did li denghui get to ride off peacefully into the sunset without his head on a pike, but the GMD also got to keep their ill-gotten loot more or less intact.
contrast that to the caucescus. not a bad deal, really.
2 iacob // Oct 7, 2007 at 2:53 am
I don’t think that Li Keqiang or Xi Jinping will be fighting over screen time on CCTV, nor that the Chinese public will take sides on a large scale. Apathy is the defining political attitude these days. Hu’s daily appearance on the CCTV evening news is protocol, but if it were up to viewers, something else would be broadcast. Candidates for future leadership will not influence public opinion significantly by appearing on that program.
While Li Datong’s prognosis is optimistic, the granite studio author’s parallel to Kangxi is overly pessimistic. Perhaps neither democracy nor the imperial past are useful when discussing the idiosyncratic workings of the CCP.
3 花崗齋之愚公 // Oct 7, 2007 at 3:53 pm
Wu Ming,
Can’t remember the citation off the top, but I recall reading something about Romania being held up in CCP as an Example Of We Do Not Want To Happen during the 1989 demonstrations. Doubt it would have, but the specter was there.
4 花崗齋之愚公 // Oct 7, 2007 at 3:56 pm
Iacob,
I agree about Hu on CCTV but that’s because people know what they’re going to get. If the leadership situation were murkier, would that generate interest?
Also sorry for not being clear. I wasn’t trying to make an exact parallel between this situation and Kangxi (other than the possibility of increased factionalism and gridlock). Just bringing up one–of many–succession squabbles from the past.
Thanks for stopping by.
5 Brendan // Oct 7, 2007 at 9:30 pm
The really cool (and really chilling) thing about Yinzhen’s power grab was the he changed the names of two of his brothers (Yinti and someone else, I think?) to ‘acina’ and ’seshe,’ the Manchu words for ‘cur’ and ’swine.’ That’s just rubbing it in.
6 Anonymous // Oct 21, 2007 at 2:06 pm
Rather, keep on considering the LDP and the Canadian Liberal Party. They run what are effectively 1.5 party states. Come election time, they almost always win, but there’s both a real opposition and a lack of the West criticizing them for not being real democracies. It’s possible that the GMD was trying to transition to this sort of system, but LDH flipped the frying pan into their face. Given that Ma Yingjiu has such nice good looks, he probably wasn’t home when that happened.
Yaha. I sort of agree with Li Datong on this issue, and I’m curious as to what knowledge Russian Kreminologists could impart. This somehow looks similar to the decline of the CCCP and, really, the decline of any centralized authoritarian government. Eventually, getting the right people to the top becomes harder and harder.
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