IHT: Wang Hui and China’s New New Left
Update 10/15/06: Wang is also the subject of a magazine piece in this morning’s Sunday NYT: “China’s New Leftist.”
Interesting article in the IHT today about Wang Hui, the Tsinghua University professor and editor of Dushu (读书) who is perhaps the most prominent of China’s New (New?) Leftist intellectuals. Wang’s basic argument is that even though the reform era has brought some good things to China this does not mean socialism has lost its viability or that the Left in China has abdicated its responsibility to protect people from the ravages of laissez-faire capitalism and globalization.
Wang can come across as something of a crank. He thinks the reform process reached its high point in 1985. He bemoans the inclusion of business people into the CCP. He prefers to call himself a “critical intellectual” rather than a leftist. (And given the legacy of “Leftism” in China, who can blame him?) But despite the change in terminology, Wang remains committed to socialism and feels that the excesses of the past are not an excuse to abandon socialist principles in a headlong rush for economic growth at all costs.
He may be on to something. Ronald Reagan would love Shanghai, and why not: The CCP has ripped whole pages from the Reagan playbook. “Are you better off now than you were four years ago?” “It’s Morning again in China.” This resonates with the urban elite who make up the bulk of the CCP leadership as well as the party rank and file (and to whom the CCP has always catered, even when they proclaimed otherwise–the GLF, anyone?). You see these guys on the streets of Beijing. Shanghai. Shenzhen. Even Tianjin. “Four years ago I rode my bike to work and spilled tea out of a leaky jar, now I drive a Passat and I’m sipping Hennessy–I might hate the taste, but I look successful and now (added bonus) I’m getting laid.”
But obviously there have been those left out, left behind, and stepped all over in the mad rush for the gold ring and there’s a lot of people in this latter category that are starting to, if not actually stand up, slouch just a little bit less. There were 84,000 acts of collective violence last year, mostly directed at government and business interests and that’s just the number the government gives–who knows how many more went unreported.
Enter a guy like Wang Hui. I would agree with him that rampant “GDP-ism” and extreme laissez-faire capitalism are at the root of many of China’s social, environmental, and even political problems. Wang’s a brilliant guy and he’s got credentials. He was one of the last students cleared from the square in 1989; nobody’s sayin’ he doesn’t have the stones. The problem is that Wang, in the sub-cockles of his heart, is a reactionary and he still views the CCP as a force for change. And it is here where Wang Hui loses me.
Wang may lament the inclusion of capitalists into the CCP, but the real problem is the lack of an efficient system of checks and balances–making officials accountable to the people through an independent judiciary and an independent media. Far from being a bulwark of socialism, the CCP actually fosters a climate where legal protections and social programs can be placed on the books at the center and effectively gutted of all meaning by the time they trickle down the party bureaucracy to the local areas. It’s the nature of a one-party system that punishes dissent.
As long as the CCP insists on one-party rule, the patterns of crony capitalism and corruption will worsen. All the anti-corruption purges, calls for a ‘harmonious society, or labor reform in the world won’t matter so long as officials are judged from the top down and the main criterion for official advancement is regional economic development. China’s problems are not going away on their own, wishing won’t make it so, and Wang Hui, for all his merits, is betting on a horse that’s running down the wrong track.
You’re a star: chinalawblog.com
@Jeremy,
Thanks for checking in. Where you’ve been?
I was quite surprised really. The CLB is one of the most widely read and respected English language blogs on China and I really appreciated their kind words about this little project of mine.
Fascinating. Albert Einstein summed up my thoughts on this better than I can:
“Problems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them.”
Man, I was just reading this and was thinking about guest posting on Peking Duck. I’d like to run a couple of thoughts past you first though:
“Lu Xun, Wang explained to me, was a writer of the left, but he was very critical of left-wing writers and activists. He criticized Chinese tradition, but was also an excellent classical scholar. He welcomed the Western idea of progress, but was also skeptical of it. The paradoxes in Lu Xun helped Wang to see that Chinese modernity could not be a simple matter of abandoning the old and embracing the new — as it had been for both Maoists and free-market capitalists.”
I don’t know anything about Wang Hui, but if this is what his Lu Xun work (which I’ve heard of) is about, then he had me at “paradox”. Given my recent PKD post, you can see where I’m coming from. Which leads me to ask, have you heard of JR Pusey’s book “Lu Xun and Evolution”? Frank Dikotter, who is a bit of an odd one himself, savaged it in a review at Journal of Asian Studies, but Pusey’s “China and Charles Darwin” got a thumbs up from Andrew Nathan (who gets all these documents for his books from… somewhere?). Whassup with that?
Anyway, back to Wang Hui. You said:
“Wang may lament the inclusion of capitalists into the CCP, but the real problem is the lack of an efficient system of checks and balances–making officials accountable to the people through an independent judiciary and an independent media.”
But wait a minute: this is the Wang Hui who is reported here to have helped workers sue (independent judiciary would be important there) a private developer who got a plum deal from a local state company. Sounds like he’s real into checks and balances, and when he says:
“People claim that the market will automatically force the state to become more democratic. But this is baseless. We only have to think about the alliance of elites formed in the process of privatization. The state will change only when it is under pressure from a large social force, like the workers and peasants.”
He sure as hell doesn’t sound like he’s advocating top down solutions. If anything, he sounds like a guy who would be skeptical of the recent state unionization of my local (Quanzhou) Walmart.
I also sympathize with Cui Zhiyuan’s difficulty with their relationship with the state. Not because they want to tow the line, but because I can see why they fear the collapse of the CCP as leading to anarchy. He doesn’t say as much, but I believe that’s why they take a middle line – not because they are apologists. And the comment about the “different aspects” of local and central government seems a given to me.
“Which is not to say that the New Left embraced an easy antiglobalist position; it has been critical of recent anti-Japanese and anti-American outbursts among urban, middle-class Chinese — of what Wang dubbed “consumer nationalism.””
Uh, every high roller I know in China drives a foreign car. Consumer nationalism is actually something I’ve tried to persuade friends in the new middle/upper class to do – to buy Chinese to support China, as opposed to boycotting foreign goods because they’re “anti-China” – and they respond by saying “but Chinese cars are shit”. I think a “Buy Chinese” campaign would be a far better use of nationalist fervor than throwing rocks, but whenever I suggest it to well-off Chinese friends, the idea of buying Chinese goods seems to remind them that they believe Chinese goods are no good. No one really takes seriously the argument that perhaps by being influential consumers they could demand better quality instead of essentially abandoning domestic products. For me, this naturally arcs back towards the whole insecurity/identity issue.
Uh, that was a mess of issues. Feel free to pick and choose.
@Dave
Thanks for stopping by. First, let me say that I’ve really enjoyed your thoughtful guest posts at TPD and I’m delighted to have you share your ideas here in this space as well.
My criticism of Wang Hui is not of his own actions. I admire Wang for his dedication, his activism, and many of his positions. Where I disagree with Wang is his continued faith in the transformative power of the CCP.
—————————————————————–
From the NYT today:
“Cui does not regard the Communist regime as a “totality.” There were, he said, many different aspects of it, at both the local and central levels. “Almost every day,” Cui said, “The New York Times carries reports of peasants agitating against the Communist government, but if you listen to what the peasants are saying, they are telling the central government that the local government has violated their rights. So even the peasants can see the different aspects of the state, who supports them and who doesn’t.”
—————————————————————-
In one sense, I agree. I do believe there is a powerful disconnect between center and local in China (as you pointed out, hasn’t there always been?) that prevents the effective implementation and enforcement of central directives that might be beneficial for the people. The people seek justice and redress under laws already on the books but are foiled, for example, by the close relationships between local officials and the private developers who line their pockets and keep them in expensive cars.
Unfortunately, the CCP has little interest in allowing for a truly independent judiciary. There are many reasons for this, not the least of which is a long mistrust of litigation by the state going back to imperial times. The central government may regret the way local party bosses ignore its directives and the central government can still occasionally ‘shock the system’ through anti-corruption drives, spiritual pollution campaigns, etc. But the truth is, local officials know that the courts lack the political will, the independence, or the teeth to side against powerful local political and economic interests and the cases are too numerous for the center to reach down and intervene in each and every one.
As for top-down, I think you may have misunderstood my critique. I was not suggesting that Wang Hui favored top-down solutions, far from it, but that it is the central government who holds local officials accountable from the top down, as opposed to being held to accounts by the local stakeholders. This has pretty much always been the case in China. In the Qing, the official performance was tied to two—occasionally mutually exclusive—things above all else: tax collection and the preservation of order. In the PRC today, the primary criterion is economic development and preservation of order. In the Qing, taxes could be extracted up to the point of loss of control over the populace. Today, economic development continues unabated until local stability is threatened. In the Qing, the local people would always lament that if only the emperor came to their village and saw how they lived, he would save them from these wicked officials. Wang Hui hears something similar in the recent incidents of extralegal collective action and collective violence against the state and allied business interests. The central government and the villagers might well have common cause in the situations that led to these incidents, but the government’s need to maintain control over dissent and criticism of itself at all levels places severe limitations on legal grassroots activism of any kind.
Even if there are people in the CCP, in the center, who sympathize with the plight of the people, what should the CCP do? To roll back economic development would risk slowing the economy and the CCP’s new slogan (after Reagan, now Clinton) is “It’s the economy, stupid.” To give people the means to seek redress under the law or the media to report on violations of state law would open the floodgates to a wave of litigation and corruption scandals that would erode CCP legitimacy. Even central government (top down) crackdowns on corruption need to be handled carefully, lest it appear the CCP is admitting to the endemic nature of corruption in today’s China. The CCP has experimented (sort of) with local elections, but just recently Wen Jiabao said that they had no plans to expand the experiments further in the near future. Part of the problem is that to expose local officials as truly accountable to all stakeholders in local society would mean an exercise in democracy with which neither the CCP nor the urban elites would feel truly comfortable.
Wang Hui is trying to work from within a system that, as of right now, prevents the kinds of changes he would like to see. Without a truly independent judiciary, an independent media, and an independent civil society, the problems of environmental degradation, corruption and economic inequality (to name three) will remain intractable. I am of course hopeful that solutions can be found, but I am still skeptical.
Sorry for the long reply.
@Dave,
I’m not up on Lu Xun as much as I should be. But a regular contributor over here, Wu Ming, is our house Lu Xun expert, and I defer to him in these matters.
@SM,
Have you read these books yet? I’m sure with the new baby and all, you’ve got a ton of time to read…
@Dave,
Finally, as for consumer nationalism, I think there are two competing projects going on right now among China’s urban elite. There is of course a growing sense of nationalism and a striving for a stronger national identity. But there is also a definite project of class differentiation whereby the consumption of foreign (especially luxury) goods is an important marker of class and status in China’s urban areas. In this case, proving that you are not “tu 土” is more effective than showing one’s patriotic credentials when getting the girl to notice you up in the club.
Does this mean class identity trumps nationalism?…well, I’m not even going to touch that one with a barge pole but anyone who wants to…have at it.
Hi there, I just put up a post about the NYT article at TBD – it’s not any kind of analysis, just an informational, “hey, read this article, guys” post. I linked to this piece as well, thanks to Brendan. If either J. or Dave wants to write a more analytic or opinion-based post, please email to me, and I’ll post. redandexpert at that yahoo place.
Thanks Lisa (and Brendan). I was surprised to see me quoted over at TPD but I appreciate the shout out. I really respect and admire what Richard has done over the years and, as I said to Dave, I have been very impressed by the stewardship of the site in recent weeks with Richard absent.
I’d be interested to see how the conversation around this issue develops over at TPD, there are a number of Q.C.’s more in tune with contemporary political issues than I am and it’s sure to be fascinating reading.
Truthfully, I often don’t feel up to the task (I’m not really an essayist by inclination and see my job more as facilitating the conversation). Dave has been a lifesaver.
Anyway, back to the topic at hand – great post, J., and congrats on the acknowledgment from CLB – it’s well-deserved.
lu xun expert? i’m no 趙七爺. < rimshot > doesn’t surprise me that wang “got” lu xun, though, who was also a bit of a crank.
i’m not as convinced that wang hui is wrong here, although a lot of things would have to change for the sclerotic and deeply compromised CCP to make the reforms that wang is calling for. but then, the KMT coped with falling out of power rather gracefully (for such things), and didn’t even end up on the ends of pitchforks while doing so (something that i wish the CCP 胖羊 types would take note of.
i think he’s ahead of the curve, cranky though he might be.
on a related note, did you catch this article in the NYTimes about china making sopme labor reforms that strengthened unions instead of busting them? i remember reading a brief article in reenmin ribao during the 十六大 that brought up something similar, albeit tentatively, but it would be a real shift if they actually pulled it off.
@花崗齋之愚公: I guess we’re talking about two issues. One is what Wang Hui thinks, and the other is what the CCP will/can do. The two, to me, seem connected.
For Wang Hui, I really would like to know more about him, but yes he and others seem stuck in the system demanding things the system refuses to deliver. Your post said Wang Hui and his crew are betting on the wrong horse running down the wrong track. I wonder “Is there another horse available on any other track?”
I think we’re in near total agreement as to the reluctance of the CCP to implement any of these feedback mechanisms (ind. judiciary, media, etc. etc.) What I wonder about, and what I think plagues Wang Hui and others, is what other way could these changes possibly come about? A revolution followed by the return of Sun Yatsen republican democracy? A Taiwan model? After living in Xinjiang three years, all I can say is if the CCP collapses there’s gonna be some civil war. The aggrieved nationalism of several parties, which has a life of its own, will make sure that happens. As Cui Zhiyuan says when asked about their relationship with the govt, it’s a real challenge. I think that’s because a real old strain of thought is at play here: the fear of anarchy. And I can’t really fault them for that, because I know people who will embrace that anarchy if it comes.
“Does this mean class identity trumps nationalism?…well, I’m not even going to touch that one with a barge pole but anyone who wants to…have at it.”
I’ll take it. Yes, and it’s got a deeper root in Chinese society than nationalism (in any sort of racial, ethnic, or otherwise imagined boundaries you’d care to ascribe to older dynasties that didn’t know of the modern “nation-state”). Sometimes I think that outward nationalism is only there to cover up the fact.
To wit, your post on One Country, Two Prices. Chinese solidarity, of course. But in the name of what? Individual prosperity.
@Dave,
Good response. I like your take.
@Wu Ming,
I saw the labor article (there’s actually a link to it in the Wang Hui post). I am hopeful that, as you said, the CCP might transform itself and even step aside for the good of the country. It’s a nice thought. I just don’t see it happening any time soon. On a very broad level, the CCP is facing some of the same challenges as the Qing court in the last decades of imperial rule. The reforms needed to cope with the problems facing the regime (which are different but no less serious) would ultimately transform the system beyond the comfort zone of those in power. The result is a series of half-hearted reforms (The Qing New Policies, anyone?). Again, the parallels are not exact and can only be painted in the broadest strokes, but I think there are enough similarities to merit a comparison, if only for heuristic purposes.
Aw, crap. I had a whole other comment on Wang Hui but it got lost. Short remix:
Perhaps it’s not so much Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan put faith in socialism or the CCP as far as you seem to believe, but rather that they see no other choice. The CCP has made it a zero-sum game by virtue of it being an authoritarian state. It’s more or less incapable of accomodating rivals. Therefore, it’s either the CCP makes life better, or total collapse. What happens if the CCP collapses? My time in Xinjiang says that competing nationalisms and regional identities pretty much guarantee a period of civil/independence wars.
If I were Wang Hui, that might have me banking on the CCP too. The other choice is bloodshed, chaos, and if you think Chinese nationalism is bad now… woo, boy. I don’t wanna see that puppy. So I tend to be more sympathetic to Wang Hui and others who work with the party, because I’m partial to their fatalist rationale.
I am all ears, however, suggestions for other paths China might take.
@Wu Ming: I like the KMT idea. There’s a suggestion. But I bring up Xinjiang again, as well as Tibet and god knows if anyone else would be that way – the KMT in Taiwan didn’t face any threat of breakaway states combined with a very touchy nationalist insecurity regarding borders. Those fellas had it easy in that respect.
Oh, and Wu Ming? That’s my Chinese name, 无名. Seriously. It’s on my business card.
@ Dave,
I’ve really enjoyed your contributions to this discussion. I hope you continue checking the site and adding your comments and I look forward to seeing the “Musings Under the Tenement Palm” site back up soon, too.
Whenever I hear the term “managed collapse” for a regime, I feel the same way I do when football announcers say a player has a “minor groin tear.” The adjectives don’t quite fit the nouns.
There’s some truth to what you say. I remember reading an op/ed piece last spring (can’t remember the author) that argued in the wake of the CCP stepping aside, there would be a significant chance that the replacement–ultra-nationalist, military strongman–might be worse. I don’t see that as the only possible outcome, but it’s worth considering. History does suggest (most recently in the early 20th century) that when the center crumbles, the peripheries of the empire, particularly non-Han areas, tend to spin off and do their own thing. Is it a zero-sum game, as you argue? I’m a bit more optimistic than you are, but I would agree that the odds on a peaceful transition are not very good.
Two question remain, for Wang Hui or whomever: First, are China’s problems fixable given the current parameters of CCP rule. The second question is: Are China’s problems (political, economic, social, environmental) going to create a situation where the regime is threatened even if it maintains the status quo? If the answer to the second question is “yes” (debatable but possible) then it becomes a no-win situation. If the CCP were to shift the parameters of its rule, it becomes like that Chinese bar game where each player pulls blocks aside until finally the structure topples.
As I’ve said before, I’m hopeful they can do it and I really hope Wang Hui is correct in his assessments, but I’m just not sure he is. I just don’t think that the CCP leadership, as presently constituted, has got the stones to make the kinds of changes needed. They’re likely to wait, and tinker, keep fingers crossed, and hope things get better.
I suppose one’s views on this debate depend on how one sees the severity of China’s problems.
Hey, likewise. I’m happy to find another China blogger with an academic inclination. I like Froginawell, and a few others as well, but stylistically I really appreciate 花崗齋之愚公. By the way, I don’t quite get the Chinese name of the blog. Is it a reference?
I’m not so sure that it’s a zero-sum game. In some ways I believe it is, based heavily on my experience in Xinjiang. If the CCP has a “managed collapse”, a bit of an oxymoron I agree, Xinjiang would become a complete basketcase. Uyghurs would suddenly let out a huge noise, and freedom of seccession, which Mao once promised then took away, would be a big part of that loud noise. Modern Chinese identity, with its heavy dependence on borders, wouldn’t accept that. And that’s without even going into the process of dismantling the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the Central Government’s direct control of the region, etc. etc. etc. Maybe no civil war, or seccession, but I can’t see a way to avoid total disruption. The mechanisms for organizing civil society amongst the very alienated Uyghurs have mostly been purged. Either you allow them a voice, which they will use to condemn you, or you don’t. Period. And instead of moving towards such a transition, activity in Xinjiang has been pretty much status quo – perhaps even stricter, depending on how you look at it.
But I guess my larger point is that whether this is true or not doesn’t matter so much as it appears the idea that “if the center crumbles, the rest will spin out of control” seems to be a given assumption in the thinking of the CCP and guys like Wang Hui. In fact, I think it’s rooted in the Uyghurs thinking as well, and generally all of China. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy – we must control everything because otherwise things will fly apart. Why will things fly apart? Because they will react extremely to being under such strict control. For the Uyghurs: They must control us, because otherwise we will kick their ass. While will you kick their ass? Because they are controlling us! This is a vicious cycle and I don’t see “transition” being anything but craziness.
So I think Wang Hui would answer your questions like this. Mind you, this is pure supposition:
*Are China’s problems fixable given the current parameters of CCP rule?
Perhaps not, but no one has any idea of the parameters of any other kind of rule – which cannot be speculated about in the pages of Dushu, and history prophecizes the following period will necessarily be anarchy. “You go to reform with the single party system you’ve got, not the multi-party system you wish you had”, seems to be the Rumsfeldian thinking between the lines Wang Hui’s position.
*Are China’s problems (political, economic, social, environmental) going to create a situation where the regime is threatened even if it maintains the status quo?
Wang seems to think that the answer is yes, the regime must change the status quo. But that doesn’t appear to include changing one party rule, because he probably believes that would invite total chaos. There’s a lesser of two evils approach going on here.
My answers personally to the above would be “no” and “Not sure, but with a no-y aftertaste”. The second because I’m not convinced that China’s problems are of the sort that build into an existential crisis. Big problems, sure, but I think alot of people are reading in a pressure cooker narrative that isn’t proven.
Hey, likewise. I’m happy to find another China blogger with an academic inclination. I like Froginawell, and a few others as well, but stylistically I really appreciate 花崗齋之愚公. By the way, I don’t quite get the Chinese name of the blog. Is it a reference?
I’m not so sure that it’s a zero-sum game. In some ways I believe it is, based heavily on my experience in Xinjiang. If the CCP has a “managed collapse”, a bit of an oxymoron I agree, Xinjiang would become a complete basketcase. Uyghurs would suddenly let out a huge noise, and freedom of seccession, which Mao once promised then took away, would be a big part of that loud noise. Modern Chinese identity, with its heavy dependence on borders, wouldn’t accept that. And that’s without even going into the process of dismantling the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the Central Government’s direct control of the region, etc. etc. etc. Maybe no civil war, or seccession, but I can’t see a way to avoid total disruption. The mechanisms for organizing civil society amongst the very alienated Uyghurs have mostly been purged. Either you allow them a voice, which they will use to condemn you, or you don’t. Period. And instead of moving towards such a transition, activity in Xinjiang has been pretty much status quo – perhaps even stricter, depending on how you look at it.
But I guess my larger point is that whether this is true or not doesn’t matter so much as it appears the idea that “if the center crumbles, the rest will spin out of control” seems to be a given assumption in the thinking of the CCP and guys like Wang Hui. In fact, I think it’s rooted in the Uyghurs thinking as well, and generally all of China. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy – we must control everything because otherwise things will fly apart. Why will things fly apart? Because they will react extremely to being under such strict control. For the Uyghurs: They must control us, because otherwise we will kick their ass. While will you kick their ass? Because they are controlling us! This is a vicious cycle and I don’t see “transition” being anything but craziness.
So I think Wang Hui would answer your questions like this. Mind you, this is pure supposition:
*Are China’s problems fixable given the current parameters of CCP rule?
Perhaps not, but no one has any idea of the parameters of any other kind of rule – which cannot be speculated about in the pages of Dushu, and history prophecizes the following period will necessarily be anarchy. “You go to reform with the single party system you’ve got, not the multi-party system you wish you had”, seems to be the Rumsfeldian thinking between the lines Wang Hui’s position.
*Are China’s problems (political, economic, social, environmental) going to create a situation where the regime is threatened even if it maintains the status quo?
Wang seems to think that the answer is yes, the regime must change the status quo. But that doesn’t appear to include changing one party rule, because he probably believes that would invite total chaos. There’s a lesser of two evils approach going on here.
My answers personally to the above would be “no” and “Not sure, but with a no-y aftertaste”.
Dave,
“Not sure but with a no-y aftertaste.” I love it.
I enjoy Frog in a Well also. They’ve got a great team over there. I haven’t seen too many other blogs dealing specifically with Chinese history. I’m sure they’re out there so if you know of any, please send me the links.
Many do not understand the economic developement model that China is following; this model may be called “Taiwan model” since Taiwan was the first to follow this model provided by globalization. Whether democritization is the natural outcome of this developement model is still an issue needed to be debated hotly, but deliberately avoided by many scholars. Taiwan model is not only compatible but is nourished by all social injustices since it requires low cos labor and massive destruction of environments so that foreign capitals can come in to manufacture goods to be exported to America to sustain the borrow and spend habit of American consumers. If workers are fairly treated, their wages will rise rapidly and the developement model will come to the end. For anyone interested in the detailed workings of this developement model, please see Comment 39 on the website forcastglobaleconomy.com, or to the website shancheng.org for its Chinese translation.